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Introduction
Population aging is increasing the ratio of retirees to workers rising sustainability issues to Social Security systems. To ease financial pressures as well as to increase older workers labor force participation policy makers have been promoting the expansion of working lives finding measures that postpone labor market exit attractive.
This has been enforced through the elimination of mandatory retirement, the adoption of age discrimination legislation 1 and/or increasing legal retirement age. Nonetheless, the effect of these measures on older workers labor supply is not straightforward. For instance, Shannon and Grierson (2004) show that making compulsory retirement illegal would have a small impact on the size of the older workforce and, for that reason, such a policy alone would not solve the problems associated with an aging population and the consequent reduction in the share of the population employed, while Ashenfelter and Card (2002) , studying the effect of the elimination of mandatory retirement at age 70 on faculty retirement patterns, conclude that such elimination decreased by approximately two thirds the retirement rates of 70 and 71 year olds.
On the other hand, Adams (2004) suggests that age discrimination legislation increases employment among individuals that are in the legally protected age ranges and that there is a decline in retirement among the protected workers. Also, Neumark and Stock (1999) show that age discrimination laws lead to steeper age-earnings profiles in the labor market and that they strengthen the relationship between workers and firms, leading to the adoption of Lazear (1979) contracts. Furthermore, the authors find that age discrimination legislation increases the relative employment of older workers.
Focusing on the labor demand implications of a change in the legal retirement age for women in Portugal, Martins et al. (2009) find that older women affected by the new law faced virtually no change in wages and working hours.
There seems to be no unique and effective instrument to achieve a longer and higher participation of older individuals in the labor force. This paper brings another variable to the discussion on active aging policies: it studies the impact of a reduction in hours of work before retirement on the age of exit from the labor force. Indeed, combining a reduction in working hours with increased leisure time at older ages may motivate individuals to work longer while gradually withdrawing from the labor market. As individuals age, their 3 preference for work and leisure experience a change since older workers may get higher satisfaction from additional hours of leisure and less hours of work than younger workers.
Also, due to health constraints or care obligations, as workers age they may want to reduce their hours of work. This change in the valuation of time implies a change in reservation wages over the life cycle, which influences the labor force participation decision.
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If workers could freely choose hours of work they would prefer to gradually reduce their time at work as they age (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004) . Since the decision does not depend solely on the individual's will, gradual retirement is not as common as workers would like it to be (Hutchens and Grace-Martin, 2006) . Although there is evidence for the United States that some workers engage in 'part-time' retirement by working fewer hours in the years prior to complete withdrawal from the labor force (Ruhm, 1990; Burtless and Moffit, 1985; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984) , most people move directly from full-time work to full-time retirement (Hutchens and Grace-Martin, 2006) . As Gielen (2009) notes, a discrete drop in hours of work is only observed at the time of retirement, not before.
Given that most often workers face the choice of working full-time or no time (retirement), the constraint in hours of work may influence the labor force participation decision. In fact, there are broad indications suggesting that reduced hours of work would contribute to raise employment rates of older individuals. In the European Union, older workers are already over-represented in part-time employment and Member States, like Sweden, with higher shares of older workers in part-time employment tend to present higher employment rates for the 55-64 age group. However, part-time employment is not very common in the Portuguese labor market 3 and, nevertheless, the economy shows high employment rates for older individuals.
Despite the fact that flexibility in hours of work is perceived to be a relevant policy mechanism to increase older individuals' labor force participation, few studies focused on its effect on labor supply. Among these, Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) show that working hours' flexibility extends the working lives of older workers, but produces only a small net increase in labor supply. Gielen (2009) finds that, especially for full-time workers, over-employed older women (those reporting that they wish to work fewer hours than the actual hours of work) leave the labor force prematurely due to the absence of gradual retirement opportunities. Nonetheless, a striking finding is that flexibility in hours of work would result in a reduction of older workers' labor supply since the increase in labor 4 participation of older workers due to the extension of their working careers is cancelled out by a decline in working hours of over-employed older individuals.
From a labor demand point of view, the work by Hutchens and Grace-Martin (2006) studies how and why establishments differ in their willingness to permit an older worker to take phased retirement. Phased retirement is perceived to be a way of encouraging older workers to extend their working lives. In this sense, workers reduce their working hours without changing employers (Hutchens and Papps, 2005) . The former authors conclude that employers are willing to permit phased retirement but primarily as an informal arrangement. Opportunities for phased retirement are greater in establishments that employ part-time workers, allow job sharing and have flexible starting times (this latter result is also obtained by Blau and Schvydko, 2007) .
If flexibility in hours of work, as a means of gradual retirement, can effectively delay the exit from the labor force then workers who actually take advantage of such flexibility are expected to leave the labor market later in their lives.
Overall, retirement decisions are influenced by individual characteristics, demographic factors, and financial incentives (Mitchell and Fields, 1984; Dugan, 1984; Belloni and Alessie, 2008) , health conditions (Burtless and Quinn, 2000; Bartel and Sicherman, 1993; Hanoch and Honig, 1983; Quinn, 1977) and labor market constraints (Osberg, 1993; Bartel and Sicherman, 1993; Friedberg, 2003; Dorn and Sousa-Poza, 2009 ). This paper examines the influence of working hours' reduction before retirement on the retirement decisions of older individuals and intends to provide an answer to the following questions: is the reduction in hours of work associated with retirement at later ages? Can it be used to extend older workers' labor force participation and delay the complete withdraw from the labor force? We find that a voluntarily reduction of working hours is associated with exit from the labor market at earlier ages.
The main contribution of this research is to explore the relevance of working hours' reduction on the retirement behavior of older individuals. No such study exists for Portugal and, hence, besides the novelty of this research for the Portuguese labor market it is also a new contribution to the incipient literature on the subject. Additionally, we take advantage of a recent and, to our knowledge, not yet used inquiry called "Transition to
Retirement", conducted simultaneously with the 2006 Portuguese Labor Force Survey.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the major legislation changes on retirement benefits eligibility in Portugal. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the model and the empirical strategy. Results are shown in Section 5 5 while sensitivity analysis is performed in Section 6. A summary and discussion conclude the paper.
Legal setting on retirement in Portugal
To accommodate demographic aging and its impact on the Social Security system the Portuguese government has approved several legislation changes concerning retirement over the last fifteen years.
Since 1999, 65 years is the minimum legal age that grants access to full retirement pension both for male and female workers in Portugal. By the end of 1993, the promulgation of a legal diploma set a gradual standardization of the legal retirement age (LRA) for both men and women, with effectiveness from 1994 onward. Until then, the LRA was 65 years for men and 62 years for women, and this law increased the LRA for women by six months every year until reaching 65 years old (the LRA by 1999). Other major changes introduced by the law were, on one hand, a raise from 10 to 15 in the required number of years with payments to Social Security for a worker to become eligible for retirement benefits and, on the other hand, a change on the pensions' method of computation.
At the beginning of 1999, and in the course of macroeconomic growth, the age of access to retirement was rendered more flexible, according to contributions' profiles. In this sense, a new law made it possible for workers at least 55 years old and a working career of 30 complete calendar years to become eligible to pension benefits. Even though there was a reduction factor linked to early retirement pensions, this flexibility imposed significant financial pressure on the Social Security system. As a consequence, the legal norms that allowed access to a pension before the worker reached the legal retirement age Through legal changes, policy makers are trying to delay older workers' exit from the labor force. In effect, as is inscribed in the 2012 Portuguese Government Budget Law proposal, the minimum early retirement age will increase to 57 years old.
An important feature of the Portuguese legislation on retirement is that there is no possibility of partial retirement, that is, workers cannot continue in the labor market 6 through part-time employment while receiving partial retirement pension. Retirement is a full-time job.
For a comprehensive synopsis on retirement legislation changes in Portugal see Appendix A.
Data
The data used in the empirical analysis comes from a specific module of the Portuguese and the "Transition to Retirement" module. Women represent more than half of the Labor Force Survey sample, and this is also the case for the subsample of individuals aged 50 to 69. However, gender representation is reversed in the "Transition to Retirement" module, with men accounting for 53% of the responses. Therefore, the module sample does not reproduce accurately the Labor Force Survey's gender composition.
From the initial sample we have excluded the military for they face a specific labor market (22 individuals), students (26 observations), and also unpaid household workers (371 observations -99% of which are women) or other inactive older individuals (386 observations) due to a fragile involvement in the labor market. Also, we left out the unemployed (236 observations) because their motivation towards the reduction in hours of work is naturally biased, since they want to increase their actual number of hours of work (and, therefore, may report the intention of no reduction in hours of work just because 7 they are currently out of employment), and the self-employed (2871 observations) since they can more freely alter hours of work than employees.
The sample includes individuals with 15 or more years of work (80 observations deleted) because this is the minimum required number of years with payments to Social Security for a worker to become eligible for retirement benefits. Finally, miners and fishermen were also excluded (73 observations) since, due to the legally recognized weary nature of these occupations, they are subject to specific retirement legislation and may withdraw from the labor force before age 65. These exclusions led to the sample size depicted in Table 2 . (1) These have completely withdrawn from the labor force.
The questionnaire of the "Transition to Retirement" module is presented in Appendix B. Besides the variables collected through the questionnaire, the database includes additional information taken from the Labor Force Survey like gender, age, marital status, education, labor market situation (employed, unemployed, retired, home worker, student, other inactive) and nationality. For employed individuals it also presents information on the location, industry and size of the firm where they work and on the occupation, type of contract, date of admission into the firm, regime of work (part-time or full-time), hours of work and earnings. For those non-employed it shows the reason for leaving the last job, occupation held and the industry where he/she worked. Information on labor earnings before retirement is inexistent. Unfortunately, non-employed respondents were not asked about their labor income prior to retirement or unemployment. Also, the survey does not include any measure of the individual's wealth. This is regrettable since income and wealth are important determinants of the retirement decision (Hanoch and Honig, 1983; Mitchell and Fields, 1984; Dugan, 1984; Ruhm, 1990) .
Question 2 of the "Transition to Retirement" survey is the question of interest in this research: "Did you reduce or do you intend to reduce your working schedule before exiting the labor force?" The inquiry's instructions state that "exiting the labor force" means having no professional occupation with earnings as motivation, regardless of the legal 8 retirement age. A summary of the possible answers is illustrated in Table 3 according to the individuals' labor market status. Answering "Yes, I have reduced it" means that the individual has intentionally reduced his/her working hours to prepare the exit from the labor force. (1) Retired individuals that have answered "No, but intends to reduce it in the next 5 years" or "Won't reduce" were reclassified into the category "Did not reduce" for they are already out of the labor force.
As Table 3 shows, one in five retirees has reduced hours of work before retirement. shorter careers in the labor force but they retire at slightly later ages than men. Overall, Table 4 also shows that a reduction of hours of work is not very common in the Portuguese labor market: less than 10% 4 of the individuals report a reduction in hours of work as a way of gradual retirement. Women reduce hours of work to a greater extent than men, and this difference is more pronounced for those still in the labor force (i.e, employed). Almost two thirds of the individuals in the sample work in Services, which is also the activity sector where a reduction in hours of work before retirement is more prevalent, both for men and women. For 54% of the individuals the occupation held was classified as blue-collar. The definitions of blue/white collar and the industries included in each of the activity sectors are presented in Appendix C (Tables C1 and C2 ).
The sample is characterized by low educational levels: more than 60% of the individuals have 4 or less years of school attainment. This feature of the sample is not surprising given the age range of the individuals, 50 to 69 years old (which means that they were born between 1937 and 1964) and the fact that until 1986 mandatory schooling in Portugal comprised just 6 years. 5 However, almost 12% of the individuals show higher education attainment, with women reporting a higher incidence of this higher educational level.
A worker's participation in the labor force may be modelled using survival analysis where survival is interpreted as the presence in the labor market. The use of survival analysis techniques to describe the data, which is done in Figure 1 , shows that, as expected, the cumulative hazard 6 in Figure 1 is rising with age at an increasing rate and it faces a considerable increase at age 65. As shown in Table 5 , after age 65 the probability of survival is around 0.17, indicating that at that age roughly 83% of the sampled individuals were out of the labor force. Relating the Age of exit from the labor force with the Reduction variable, Figure 2 plots the survival function by reduction status (that is, if the individual reduced or not his/her hours of work) and gender. It shows that those with a reduction in hours are more likely to exit the labor market at earlier ages. This is true for both men and women, but the difference in survival times by reduction status is higher for men than for women. The Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard functions, by reduction status, shown in Table 6 , reveal that the hazard increases at a higher rate for those who reduce hours of work than it does for the individuals who do not reduce hours of work. 
Econometric setup 4.1 Transition data models: a parametric approach
Transition or duration analysis models the length of time spent in a given state (for instance, in the labor force) before transition to another state (e.g. retired). The time of transition to retirement is called "failure time". A "state" is a qualitative characteristic of an individual at a specific point in time, "transition" is the change from one state to another, and a "spell" length or duration is the time spent in a given state.
In the empirical analysis there are two possible states a person can be in: active (in the labor force) or retired (out of the labor force). By failure time we mean the age of retirement (the age of exit from the labor force). The hazard rate is defined as the probability that retirement will occur at a particular age to an individual, given that the individual is at risk (i.e. in the labor force) at that age. The hazard is an unobserved variable, but it controls both the occurrence and the timing of events (or state transitions).
Therefore, it is the fundamental dependent variable in transition data models. If the hazard is known to depend strongly on age but only weakly on time since other starting point (the date of entry in the labor force), then age is the most appropriate way to define the time scale (Allison, 1984) .
Due to the nature of the data used, some individuals are already in the initial state (thus we do not observe the date of entry into the labor market). This is relevant for the definition of the "spell". With age as the time scale and because the starting times are not 13 observed, the spell is the duration of an individual's life until retirement. From now on we will call this duration a "spell of activity" (although it does not measure the number of working years).
We assume that, once an individual leaves the initial state (becomes retired), he/she remains in inactivity (that is, there is no reversed retirement; individuals do not come back to the labor force after retirement) which is not a very strong assumption considering that, according to the European Commission (2007), more than 99% of the people that were inactive in a given year remain inactive in the following year.
Transition or survival data are usually censored since some spells are incompletely observed. A complete spell of activity can be seen for retirees but for subjects that are still in the labor force we do not observe the complete spell of activity. That means that data are right-censored or censored from above. Censoring is the main reason for modelling transitions instead of the mean duration as weaker distributional assumptions are needed to obtain consistent estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) .
A Weibull parametric regression model is used to study the effect of a reduction in hours of work on the age until which a person remains in the labor force. The Weibull has a hazard function given by (2005), with censored data the observed survival time t is the age at an incomplete spell, and the data are augmented by a censoring indicator variable. For rightcensored observations it is known that the age of retirement exceeded t so the contribution to the likelihood is
where T denotes the age of retirement without censoring, x are regressors that can vary across individuals but do not vary over a spell for a given individual and θ is a 1 
The key policy variable in the model is the reduction of hours on work before retirement and its impact on the retirement hazard is of relevance for this analysis.
Variables used in the estimation
Working hours' reduction is the explanatory variable of interest in the model. Question 2 of the survey allows four possible answers (see Table 3 ). We consider answers (c) and (d) as being the same for those employed, meaning that they will not reduce hours of work before exiting the labor force. The main issue is how to treat the workers' 'intentions of reduction ' (answer (b) Psychology. The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; 8 Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) postulates that a person's intention to engage in a behavior is the immediate determinant of that behavior. In other words, people are expected to behave in accordance with their intentions. Evidence also provides support to the theory by showing high correlations between intentions and actual behavior that range from 0.72 to 0.90 (Ajzen, 2005) . In the light of this theory, and as a second alternative, we treat reported intention of reducing hours of work as an action in order to study its effect on the elderly 'survival' in the labor force. The resulting variable is Reduction B which is equal to 0 if the person will not reduce hours of work and 1 if the individual did reduce or intends to do so. We expect that using these alternative Reduction variables will enable us to see how sensitive the age of exit from the labor force is to the assumptions made for the variable of interest.
Age is the analysis time variable and it refers to the actual age for the people that are still active (incomplete spells) but, for retired individuals (complete spells), it is the age of retirement. We use the age at which the individual started receiving a retirement pension as a proxy for the age of retirement, since the survey does not ask when he/she actually withdrew from the labor force (the retirement age) but it asks the age he/she started collecting a pension. 9 This is done in order to capture the approximate moment of failure (exit) for retirees. Also, in Question 3b of the survey people report the age at which they intend to retire and this age intention is used as the analysis time variable for employed subjects when using the Reduction B as the covariate of interest.
Another limitation as a consequence of the questionnaire's design is that it is not possible to know when the reduction started (close or far from the effective age of exit) or the amount of hours reduced (for example, if the worker made a transition from full-time to part-time employment, or if it was just a 1 hour reduction). Such information would contribute to the enrichment of the analysis.
Besides the Reduction variable we also include in the model regressors like gender, activity sector, type of occupation, education and region of residence. Additionally, for married (or living with a partner) people we include the spouse/partner labor force status (active or retired). Table 7 shows some descriptive statistics of the variables used.
16 (1) 58.66 (5.85) (1) 58.59 (5.96) (1) There are 37% of failures (retirees) in the sample which means that the rest of the observations in the sample are censored.
The overall sample is also characterized by low educational levels. Younger individuals are more educated than older ones. Indeed, only 5% of the individuals aged 65 to 69 have a university degree, against 8%, 13% and 15% for those in the age groups 60-64, 55-59 and 50-54, respectively. Women are overrepresented both at the bottom (0 years) and at the top (university) of the education ladder, and more than ¾ work in the Services. Also, women reduce hours of work more often than men. Table 8 provides additional labor market statistics concerning hours of work, activity sector and gender. It shows that women work fewer hours than men regardless of the activity sector.
Finally, from Table 7 , both the likelihood of retirement and the probability of reducing hours of work rise with age.
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Moreover, despite the assumptions made for the Reduction variable, results remain unchanged: the reduction of hours of work before leaving the labor market shortens an individual's presence in the labor force. In fact, in Table 9 the coefficient on Reduction A at column (1) suggests that reducing hours of work increases the hazard rate by 61% compared to the subjects that did not reduce hours of work. Gielen (2009) The variable Reduction that we use is more limited and less informative than the approaches used in literature. We use only an indicator variable and other studies use hours of work to assess the reduction. Additionally, these studies take advantage of longitudinal 10 Older people have a higher hazard of exit from the labor force.
data while we use cross-sectional data. Also, previous literature focuses on the labor force participation and not on the age of retirement.
One may wonder if the reduction of hours of work was the result of the will of the worker or if it was initiated by the employer. In the eminence of a layoff firms often reduce hours of work before permanent shutdown and the reduction of working time could be capturing this effect. Nevertheless, considering just the subsample of retirees, a glance at the reason for retirement (Question T10 of the survey) highlights that only 1.5% of the retirees who report a reduction in hours of work before retirement answer "job loss" as the reason for retirement. Therefore, the fear of a potential endogeneity problem can be mitigated. The coefficients for the Blue-collar variable are negative and quite similar through columns (1) to (3), Table 9 . The coefficient in column (1) shows that blue-collar workers experience a hazard rate that is only 72% of the hazard for white-collar workers. This result is consistent with the findings of Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2005) . However, this result may be capturing an income effect. In the absence of income and wealth variables, since blue-collar occupations are associated with lower earnings, that result may hint on the fact that individuals with lower wages retire at later ages.
Looking at column (2) in Table 9 , for those who are married or live with a partner, having a wife/husband that is still in the labor force reduces the retirement hazard.
Effectively, the hazard of retirement for those who have an active spouse is just 41% of the hazard for those who have a spouse who is already out of the labor force. Dorn and SousaPoza (2005) and Johnson et al. (2000) present similar findings. The former authors conclude that the odds of retiring early are 44% higher for those with a non-active partner.
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While the latter find that individuals were less likely to retire if their spouses were still working than if their spouses were already retired.
The variable Male shows no statistical significance, which means that there is no difference in the retirement hazard between men and women. Also, those working in the industrial sector face a 34% higher hazard than those working in services.
Column (3) introduces an interaction term between the Reduction variable and gender.
Results show that those who reduce hours of work face a hazard 41% higher than those who do not reduce hours. Additionally, men who reduce hours of work increase the hazard of retirement by 30%.
Dividing the sample by gender, separate estimates for men and women are presented in columns (4) and (5) of Table 9 . Both for men and women, a reduction in hours of work before retirement is associated with a higher retirement hazard. A Chow test 11 performed on these models rejects the null hypothesis of the equality of coefficients between men and women. Also, for a 95% confidence level, the difference between the gender coefficients on the Reduction A variable is statistically significant. For the Swiss case, Dorn and SousaPoza (2005) find that men are more likely to retire earlier than women. There are statistical differences in the explanatory power of the covariates for men and women. For men, the retirement hazard of those who reduced hours of work compared to those who did not (1.89) is 60 percentage points higher than the hazard obtained for women (1.39) . The interaction term estimate in column (3), Table 9 , highlights the above reported difference in the hazard for men and women, between those who reduced hours of work and those who did not.
Comparing columns (4) and (5) in Table 9 we find relevant gender differences concerning the impact of the variable Activity sector on the hazard. Effectively, men employed in agriculture experience a retirement hazard that is only 67% of the hazard for men that work in services. There are no differences in the hazard between men employed in services and those in the industrial sector. However, for women, the effect is quite the opposite: women in agriculture and in the industrial sectors face, respectively, a 43% and 85% higher hazard than women employed in services. It seems that being employed in services is associated with retirement at earlier ages for men while, for women, working in services delays retirement. Because work in agriculture and in the industrial sectors is more physically demanding, women may want to exit the labor force earlier. smaller retirement hazard compared to men in white-collar occupations (the hazard for blue-collars is only 65% of the retirement hazard for white-collar men). Since wages are particularly low in blue-collar occupations, these workers probably do not have the financial support needed to exit the labor force at early ages. As for women, there are no statistical differences between the hazards experienced by female employees in white or blue-collar occupations.
Treating intentions as the best predictor of future actions, Table 10 reports the same effect of the Reduction variable on the retirement hazard as in the previous analysis. 
All (2) Men ( From Table 10 , column (1), those who have reduced hours of work before leaving the labor market face a 13% higher hazard of retirement than those who did not. Again, it indicates that the reduction in working hours is associated with retirement at earlier ages.
When intentions are treated as effective actions (Reduction B, Table 10 ) the retirement hazard declines by 48 percentage points compared to the hazard in column (1) of Table 9 (Reduction A), but it is still higher for those who reduced hours of work. Therefore, working hours' flexibility will have no effect in expanding older workers' labor force participation.
Those who reduce hours of work leave activity earlier than those who do not. As Gielen (2009) suggests, other instruments, like the increase in the legal retirement age, seem to be more effective in delaying the exit from the labor market.
Like in Table 9 columns (3) and (4), . This is in accordance with the statistical significance of the coefficient of the interaction term.
As in Table 9 , being employed in the industrial sector reduces the likelihood of remaining in activity: columns (1) and (2) in Table 10 suggest that the hazard of retirement is 10% higher for those working in the industrial sector compared to those employed in services. However, the coefficients on this variable are smaller in Table 10 ; in fact, the hazard is reduced by 18-19 percentage points 13 when considering Reduction B rather than Reduction A. Once again, this difference is mainly due to women.
The evidence discussed so far indicates that a reduction in hours of work before retirement seems to be associated with retirement at earlier ages
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. In fact, when asked (Question 4 of the survey) if working hours' flexibility would work as an incentive to expand labor force participation, more than 90% of the elderly responded negatively.
Portuguese older workers (55-64 years) present high activity and employment rates (54% and 51%, respectively), above the European Union (EU25) average and already above the 50% threshold for the employment rate to be achieved in EU countries by 2010 (European Commission, 2008) . Table 4 in section 3 shows a strong link between older workers and the labor market: current and past working careers average above 35 years.
Until August 2005, Portuguese workers were eligible to early retirement benefits as long as they comprise the following conditions: at least 55 years old and a working career of 30 complete calendar years. Although eligible, more than half of the workers who remain in the labor force state the need of obtaining a sufficient household income as the main reason to keep working. Conditional on being in the labor force, more than 2/3 of the workers who did not reduce hours of work report the above reason to remain in the labor force while it is the reason pointed by 50% of those that have reduced hours of work.
Additionally, more than 30% of the employed individuals that have reduced hours of work say they continue to work to increase retirement benefits against 20% of the answers for those that have not reduced working hours. The percentage that keeps working for non financial reasons is higher (14%) for subjects with hours' reduction than for those that have not reduced hours of work (9%). There seems to be different financial motivations between individuals that reduce hours of work and those who do not. 13 The difference results from comparing estimates for the "Industrial" category in Columns (1) and (2), Table 10 , with columns (1) and (3) of Table 9. 14 We have also run each regression excluding the public sector. Results are not different from the ones reported.
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When someone chooses to reduce hours of work he/she knows that their labor earnings will suffer a reduction. In a country with low average wages, like Portugal, with no partial retirement mechanisms that decision embodies relevant financial implications.
Therefore, either the individual has a financial safety net that allows him/her to supplement the drop in labor income with savings from previous periods or has other types of income (such as rents, interests, etc) allowing him/her to accommodate a wage reduction. If this is the case, the same individual will be willing to retire at early ages despite the pension reduction.
Those who do not reduce hours of work may face stronger financial constraints. They may have to work full-time for as long as possible and, therefore, exit from the labor force later.
Sensitivity analysis
Parametric models for survival analysis may be implemented in the proportional hazard (PH) form or in the accelerated failure time (AFT) metric. In the PH form, the covariates have a multiplicative impact on the hazard function:
may assume a parametric form, such as Weibull, exponential or Gompertz. In the PH form, each regression coefficient indicates the proportional effect on the hazard of absolute changes in the respective covariate.
An AFT model models ln t rather than t such as:
where t is the survival time to event, x is a vector of regressors, β is the vector of coefficients, and u represents the error term with a probability density function given by (.) f . The distributional form of the error term u determines the AFT model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) . If the function (.) f has normal density, then the above model is called a lognormal regression model. Alternatively, if (.) f is of logistic density, then a log-logistic regression model is in order. When (.) f is an extreme-value density, an exponential or Weibull regression models are obtained. AFT models change the time scale by a factor of   However, when models are not nested, likelihood-ratio or Wald tests are not appropriate and an alternative statistic has to be used. The most common is the Akaike information criterion (AIC). Considering this, even though the model that best fits the data is the one with the largest log-likelihood, the preferred model is the one with smallest AIC value. Exponential and Weibull models are the only ones that can be implemented both in PH and AFT metrics.
Results reveal that the Weibull model is the preferred specification in the PH form, regardless of the Reduction variable used, since it shows the highest log-likelihood and the smallest AIC value. Since the Weibull can be specified both in the PH and AFT forms we can compare it with other AFT distributional forms. Doing so, the preferred specification is sensitive to the Reduction variable considered. The Weibull model is once again preferred in a specification that includes the Reduction B variable but, when the covariate of interest is Reduction A the model that best fits the data is the lognormal. In the previous section, I chose to present the results for the Weibull model for both specifications, in the PH form.
Nevertheless, we have also computed estimates using the lognormal and also the loglogistic but it produced no relevant differences compared to the Weibull estimates. This is why we report the estimates on the PH Weibull model, measuring the effect of each covariate on the hazard and not on the survival time.
Whatever the specification adopted, a reduction in hours of work before retirement increases the retirement hazard (PH form) or shortens the survival time in the labor force (around 3% to 3.8% for the Reduction A variable and about 0.8% to 1% for the Reduction B variable, in the AFT form).
As Cameron and Trivedi (2005) point out, estimation of parametric models for singlespell transition data is straightforward in the presence of censored observations but it produces inconsistent estimates if the parametric model is not correctly specified.
Therefore, as an empirical alternative, we have also used the semiparametric Cox model to 26 check the robustness of the results presented in the previous section. They remain unaltered.
A Piecewise-Constant Exponential model was another semiparametric strategy adopted. This specification does not completely characterize the shape of the hazard function; it is left to be fitted from the data and not specified a priori. The model was used to incorporate the existing ties on the age of retirement at ages 55, 60 and 65. Again, results remained unchanged.
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Summary and discussion
Reducing hours of work before permanently leaving the labor force is believed to be a potentially useful measure to improve the attractiveness of work for older workers. This research, however, shows that the reduction leads to retirement at earlier ages. Workers that choose to reduce their working schedule appear to be preparing their exit from the labor force rather than delaying it.
A reduction of hours of work is not very usual in the Portuguese labor market and this is, perhaps, the result of deficient opportunities provided by employers when it comes to flexibility in hours of work. If that is true, those older workers that actually reduce hours of work may be employed in firms that can offer phased retirement opportunities.
On the other hand, reducing hours of work implies a decline in labor earnings. In Portugal there are no partial retirement mechanisms, that is, the possibility of accumulating part-time wage with part-time retirement. Partial retirement could smooth the transition from active life into retirement, motivating workers to work longer while reducing hours of work with no significant income loss.
With these data we cannot tell if those that have reduced hours of work have more income sources. In effect, the lack of variables associated with financial incentives is a major drawback in the analysis. Also, the static, cross-sectional nature of the data does not allow us to explore some dynamic features of relevance in the study of the retirement behavior. These include the evolution of working hours in the latest years in the labor force as well as the correspondent change in wages, supplemented by information on Social Security incentives.
The use of panel data with information on income and wealth variables, on Social Security benefits, on hours of work and also on the moment that the reduction took place 15 Results for the different model specifications may be obtained from the authors upon request.
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would allow us to get more solid conclusions on the relevance of hours' flexibility among active aging policies. Disentangle what is behind this positive association between reduction and the retirement hazard for the Portuguese labor market remains a topic for future research.
Since financial incentives are significant determinants of retirement behavior, as a broad analysis for future research, and if we are to be granted access to anonymous Social Security data, we intend to combine these data with matched longitudinal employeremployee data. Doing so, it would be possible to know how much the reduction in the There is no penalization in oldage pension income
There is no additional benefit in old-age pension income Accumulation is possible, and there exists an annual actualization of the pension.
 Gradual standardization of the LRA for men and women;  Increase of the eligibility period from 10 to 15 years;  Changes the pension's method of computation. 
--------------------------
After the age of 65 and with 40 years of contributions: there is an additional benefit in the pension of 10%/year, until the worker reaches the age of 70.
Accumulation is possible, and there exists an annual actualization of the pension.
 Suspends the legal norms which allowed access to old-age pension before the worker reached the LRA. 
